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ABSTRACT 
After a long period of decline the humanities seem to be undergoing a kind of 
renaissance, with specialized institutes, a renewed rhetoric and talk of an acade-
mic core curriculum being the chief indications. The causes of the decline are 
seen as springing from a sustained intellectual attack by the sciences and social 
sciences, the disillusioning impact of fascism developing in the heart of Western 
humanism, and the dramatic social and economic changes of the past 200 years. 
Contemporary advocates of the humanities are seen as falling into three groups: 
the traditionalists who argue for an implicit worth of the humanities; pragmatists 
who see the humanities as having real use-value in terms of contemporary social 
issues; and radicals who see the humanities as a force for social change. Examples 
are offered of each of these approaches and their strengths and weaknesses 
analyzed. 
RÉSUMÉ 
Après une longue période de déclin, les humanités semblent connaître une sorte 
de renaissance. Celle-ci se manifeste par l'ouverture d'instituts spécialisés, le 
renouvellement de la rhétorique et les discussions concernant les programmes 
académiques. Ce sont des attaques venues des milieux scientifiques et des spécia-
listes des sciences sociales qui ont été les raisons du déclin des humanités, la per-
version de l'humanisme occidental par l'idéologie fasciste et, d'une manière plus 
lointaine, les spectaculaires changements économiques et sociaux des 200 dernières 
années. Les défenseurs actuels des humanités représentent trois groupes de pensées 
les traditionalistes qui plaident le mérite tacite des humanités; les pragmatistes 
qui considèrent que les humanités peuvent vraiment influencer les questions 
sociales contemporaines; et les radicaux qui considèrent que les humanités peuvent 
provoquer un changement social. Des exemples de chacune de ces approches 
sont présentés et leurs forces et faiblesses analysées. 
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There appears to be a renaissance of sorts in North American higher education, 
a re-awakening of interest in the humanities. In the midst of pervasive cynicism, 
relativism, and vocationalism there is an active discussion of the state of the 
humanities, talk of returning to a core curriculum, and the formation of humani-
ties institutes and centers across the United States and Canada. Upon close 
examination this renaissance suffers from being largely self-proclaimed, less a 
response to demand than a desperate surge for relevance, even a circling of wagons 
to fend off the philistines. My own university has recently joined this movement 
and established an Institute for the Humanities, a structure for relating the tradi-
tions of the humanities to contemporary social and cultural issues and concerns. 
The process of creating this Institute has led to considerable introspection about 
the humanities and this paper is a part of that process. 
In trying to define and assess the humanities one must, of course, start with 
the Greeks of 2500 years ago. The fact that the humanities are currently seen as 
being in decline or facing a crisis stems in large part from our obsession with this 
and other 'golden ages'. For most humanists the apogee of their world view was 
in the 5th century B.C. and it has been a long, bumpy downhill slide ever since. 
The Greek intellectual and educational ideal came to be embodied in what we call 
liberal education, with the humanities as the core. For the Greeks who counted, 
education was the essential preparation for participation as free men in affairs of 
state, " . . .to become effective as a speaker of words and a doer of deeds in the 
polity of one's peers" (McClintock, 1979). 
T h e G r e e k h u m a n i s t i c i dea l w a s a r i s t o c r a t i c a n d e l i t i s t , b a s e d o n t h e n o t i o n 
of the free man with sovereign detachment from practical activities — thought 
" . . . freed from the passions and troubles of the soul" (Thevanez, 1983). A 
humanities so conceived centered on contemplative impartiality, tolerant ration-
ality, and individualism — what we recognize as the basis for contemporary liberal-
ism. For over two millenia various Western societies have tried to re-create their 
memory of this Greek Utopia, generally producing instead corrupt or vapid 
imitations. The last great occasion for the humanities seeming to characterize 
an age in the sense of being the essential attribute of those who 'count ' was the 
closing decades of the 18th century in Western Europe. T.H. White (1950) offers 
a none too flattering glimpse into a society exulting in mastery of the humanities: 
It was astonishing how much the upper classes knew. Fox was an 
authority on Cassandra of Lycophron, known to scholars as the 
'obscure': Walpole could read a blazon or print a fine edition or write 
about the history of Richard III: the classics had been flogged into 
everybody: . . .Greek was spouted in the House of Commons, though 
with no great success: . . .all society went nightly to hear Handel or 
the opera: . . .Selwyn, who was an ignoramus, wrote his unimpressive 
letters instinctively in a mixture of English, French and Italian:. . .and 
the scandalous Wilkes, who had belonged to a Hellfire Club and who 
had set all Britain by the ears in Parliament, retired gracefully to edit 
Theophrastus. 
Such acquaintance with, indeed dependence on the humanities cannot be said to 
characterize our age, and that would appear to be no great loss. We may rightly 
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miss the Jean-Jacques Rousseaus and Thomas Jeffersons of the era, but 'society' 
of the 1780's deserves neither our admiration nor emulation. Indeed, many would 
argue that 5th century Athens is likewise undeserving. Both were ages of great 
accomplishment but were also guilty of using the many ". . .as a manured soil 
in which to grow a few graceful flowers of refined culture" (T. Dobzhansky, cited 
in Braudel, 1967). 
Still, it may be worth our while to separate the ideals, the humanistic impetus, 
from the foibles and patterns of historical social organizations. The great claim 
of the humanities on our imagination is its claim to universality, its insistence 
that there is a right way to reason, a morality or moral process that transcends 
the vagaries of time and culture, and an aesthetic sensibility that is distinctly 
human. Our museums, our universities and aspects of our popular culture pay lip 
service to such ideals and the dominant ideologies of liberalism and Marxism 
claim a common descent from them. Yet, in practical affairs the humanities and 
the ideals they embody seem little with us. Instead, it seems as though ". . .this 
great intellectual ideal of the West is about to go the way of the ocean liner and 
the country estate — comfortable, full of happy memories, extravagant, expensive 
to staff, and hopelessly out of date" (Winter, 1981).* 
What Has Gone Wrong? 
The humanist, inextricably tied to history, must first discover what has gone 
wrong before launching a renaissance in earnest. Assuming the worth and validity 
of the ideal itself, three disasters would appear to account for the current 'problem' 
of the humanities: a sustained intellectual attack on the humanities which has 
persisted for over 300 years; a record of extreme barbarism at the centre of 
Western culture in the 20th century; and the dramatic social, economic and tech-
nological changes of the past 200 years. 
In the 17th century, Francis Bacon accused the humanists of being too much 
concerned with words rather than things, too oriented to the past rather than 
the future, and too preoccupied with learning and judgment and therefore unable 
to produce new inventions or discoveries for the understanding of nature or for 
use by men. The humanities were, in his words ," . . .mere ornaments of discourse" 
(Bullock, 1980). The attack from the sciences was especially bitter for the humani-
* This sense of crisis pervades the formal institutions of the humanities such as museums and 
universities, but that may in fact say very little about the humanities per se. As Eric Rabkin 
(1978) notes: "The current wisdom is that the humanities are under assault, that they are 
enervated, that they are missionless. This wisdom reflects a t ruth , but it is not the t ruth 
it states. Books are now read by more people than ever before; more of our fellow citizens 
indulge in painting and poetry than has been the case since the emergence of commercial 
radio; and movies really are better than ever. . .The 'humanities ' are thriving. . .What 
suffers enervation is not the 'humanities ' but academic humanities depar tments - institu-
tions for study and appreciation which have confused themselves with the materials they 
study and appreciate." 
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ties since both shared a common and fundamental perception of the role of reason 
in human affairs, forged in the long struggle against ecclesiastic dominance. 
In the 19th century, Thomas Huxley made the case for science rather than 
the humanities being at the core of the educative process and Herbert Spencer 
provided the seal to the argument, placing the humanities f if th in his five cate-
gories of knowledge, the one which served to fill our leisure time interestingly 
(Jarrett, 1979). From the 19th century on we have been obsessed, rightly or 
wrongly, with the 'practical'. The humanities accordingly have suffered from an 
inability to make anything explode or travel faster in a world where little else 
matters to those in positions of influence (Hough, in Plumb, 1964). For the uni-
versal and recurrent humanist issues such as death, love,justice, tragedy, suffering 
and living with our divided natures, the new positivists claimed that science 
would either break long-standing barriers and provide answers or declare the 
questions meaningless because the answers did not conform to the criteria of 
scientific knowledge. 
The humanities were also attacked from another direction, one which they 
were more familiar with but were also vulnerable to. This attack came from 
outside the paradigm of n t ional man. Choosing carefully from the corpus of 
classical thought, the modern humanities had come to accept a rationalist view 
of man. In its extreme form, held by Marx for instance, this rationalism claimed 
that men could obtain objective knowledge about the world and, on the basis of 
this knowledge and in free association, control society and history. The scienti-
fic and positivist attack on the humanities was in fact born of this extension of 
rationalism and belief in transformation. 
For those who came to question such a view of man, this rationalism became 
the Achilles heel of the humanities. Schopenhauer attacked its progressivist 
assumptions and its faith in the essential 'goodness' of men. Dostoevsky insisted 
that reason and knowledge have always played a secondary, subordinate, auxiliary 
role in the life of peoples, and this will a lwaysbethe case.Freud(1961)described 
history, the sum of all men's activities, as a struggle between ". . .Eros and 
Death, between the instinct for life and the instinct of destruction". 
The moral issues which had for so long haunted the humanities were thus 
swept away in either a hardened scientific rationalism or a celebratory cult of 
the irrational. Thus, a contemporary psychologist can argue that it is pointless 
to ask why people behave in selfish, immoral or aggressive ways because ". . .such 
behavior is clearly reinforcing in that it gives the person or organism acting in 
such a fashion immediate satisfaction (Eysenck, 1976). Likewise, we are assured 
that where concentration camps are established and where torture becomes a 
matter of policy, " . . . there will be no lack of torturers. It is not too much reality 
that humankind is unable to bear, but too much f reedom" (Symons, 1983). 
Denied access to an audience interested in these kinds of issues, the humanities 
was being relegated to matters of taste, tolerance, and entertainment. In higher 
education, the old notion of the liberal arts has become dichotomized between 
social sciences and humanities, 'with the latter increasingly pushed toward the 
fine arts and the former toward the sciences. 
45 The Humanities and Higher Education 
Clearly much of the debate swirling about the humanities in the 19th century 
was a domestic affair, a righting of the balance tipped either too far toward 
rationalism or too far toward the literary classics. Such debates can be construc-
tive while at the same time exhaustive, thus weakening a tradition for more 
important external challenges. The challenges offered the humanities in the 20th 
century were not ones to be approached from such a weakened condition. 
The First World War provided the first blow to the 19th century faith in reason 
and progress, attacking both humanistic and scientific adherents. The centers of 
high culture seemed bent on destruction, thus lending credence to Freud's dismal 
cycle. Asians, Africans, even Eastern Europeans could engage in such behaviour, 
but centuries of humanism were supposed to act as a check on barbarism in the 
West. More traumatic yet was the subsequent immersion in fascism. This was in 
many ways the seminal disillusionment, especially when paraded before the world 
at the Nuremburg trails. George Steiner (1971) has eloquently highlighted the 
horrible truth that the most intense submersion in the humanities provides no 
protection from barbarism: 
We now know that the libraries, museums, theatres, universities, 
research centers, in and through which the transmission of the 
humanities and the sciences takes place, can prosper next to the con-
centration camps. . .We knowa l so . . . that obvious qualities of literate 
response, of aesthetic feeling, can coexist with barbaric, politically 
sadistic behavior in the same individual. Men such as Hans Frank 
who administered the 'final solution' in eastern Europe were avid 
connoisseurs and, in some instances, performers of Bach and Mozart. 
We know of personnel in the bureaucracy of the torturers and the 
ovens who cultivated a knowledge of Goethe, a love of Rilke. 
Steiner (1967) raises an even more disturbing notion in another essay, suggesting 
that a commitment to the life of the printed word, a capacity to identify deeply 
and critically with imaginary personages and sentiments may in fact tend to 
diminish the immediacy, the hard edge of actual circumstance. "We come to 
respond more acutely to the literary sorrows than to the misery next door" . 
One thinks of the passions aroused by the fate of Julie in Rousseau's LaNouvelle 
Heloise among the European aristocracy as they passed daily through the squalor 
of their times and of Rousseau's despair that knowledge seemed never to lead to 
virtue in acts. What more dismal judgment on the humanities than that they may 
in fact be causative of such dissonance between thought and deed?* 
* It is surely one of life's more twisted ironies that the man who bore such a high degree of 
personal responsibility for the inhuman aspects of fascism, Adolf Hitler, should also be an 
ardent supporter of a humanities-based system of education. The following is f rom Mein 
Kampfi 1971): 
It is the characteristic of our present materialized epoch that our scientific 
education is turning more and more toward practical subjects — in other words 
mathematics, physics, chemistry, etc. Necessary as this is for a period in which 
technology and chemistry rule. . .it is equally dangerous when the general 
education of a nation is more and more exclusively directed toward them. This 
education on the contrary must always be ideal. It must be more in keeping 
with the humanistic subjects and offer only the foundat ions . for a subsequent 
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Fascism, genocide, and the development of nuclear weapons and their links 
with the 'best and the brightest' added to the doubts concerning the relationship 
between a humanistic tradition and human behaviour. Psychologists developed 
a plethora of theories to explain the distance between thought and deed (Stanley 
Milgram's electric shock experiments were especially unnerving) and philosophers 
and historians probed the humanism of Central Europe looking for the fatal 
flaw, much as they were to probe the United States in the 1960's looking for the 
flaws that led to My Lai. The humanities as a guide to action in the world had 
been found wanting. 
Finally, the dramatic social, economic and technological changes of the past 
200 years have taken their toll on the humanities. Even in the 19th century, the 
great 'age of the machine', liberal education rooted in classical literature and 
history was still seen as essential background for a 'gentleman', the modernized 
version of the Greek 'free man' (King, 1977). The liberally educated gentlemen 
of the 19th century were trained in the classroom, the playing fields and the chapel 
to exercise effective political and moral leadership and the training generally led 
to the expected rewards. 
This aristocratic era ended in the 20th century with the humanistic 'rite of 
passage' being replaced by one based on science or commerce. Henry Ford's 
conclusion that history was "bunk" was no idle banter - he was making an 
important point for a generation of students. High culture, to which the humani-
ties had become tied, was no longer perceived as an essential attribute for attain-
ing social status. The new wave of students in higher education, primarily from 
middle and working class backgrounds, wished to acquire immediate skills, 
information, and credentials in order to gain a specific job at the end of their 
education. High culture was increasingly seen as a luxury, something that could 
be picked up later if necessary, perhaps via television or other forms of mass 
media (Stanton, 1976; Hum, 1979). Not only Greek, Latin, and Classics, but 
also history, literature and philosophy were now adornments, useful only as 
adjuncts to a more practical course of study (except, of course, to the humanities 
para-professionals and the army of teachers-to-be). 
The Rhetoric of the Humanities 
The humanities did not disappear, of course, and in fact were required disciplines 
in many educational institutions. This in part reflected the bias of those still 
devising curricula and in part was a political response to the problems posed by 
additional education in a special field. Otherwise we renounce the forces which 
are still more important for the preservation of the nation than all technical or 
other ability. Especially in historical instruction we must not be deterred f rom 
the study of antiquity. Roman history correctly conceived in extremely broad 
outlines is and remains the best mentor, not only for today, but probably for 
all time. The Hellenic ideal of culture should also remain preserved for us in its 
exemplary beauty ." 
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the new popularity of education. Christopher Lasch (1978 ) argues that beginning 
in the 19th century American authorities used the liberal arts to bring about a 
"democratization of culture", a necessary response to the growing gap between 
elite and masses. The new generation of students were introduced to their culture 
via a new, non-critical humanities - " . . .an agent for the production of knowledge 
for mass consumption", a vehicle for breaking down provincial, familial, and 
ethnic loyalties and thus creating the ideal product for a modern, corporate 
society: ". . .a person with no roots, without prejudices, enlightened in the sense 
of having no settled convictions, tolerant, able to move about freely, to mix freely 
with his co-workers, and to adapt easily to new places and living conditions". 
Lasch argues that just as the 19th century needed self-reliant, autonomous, sober, 
pious and industrious citizens, so the 20th century requires this new adaptive 
and relativist man. In both cases the humanities have been marshalled into service 
to address the need. 
The humanities as prostitute is not a pleasant picture. Whether servicing the 
career aspirations of students or the cultural and political needs of the state, 
either way it is not the role which the rhetoric of the humanities proclaims for 
itself. The rhetoric is impressive in volume, range and goals. If we are to launch 
a renaissance, this rhetoric provides a hint of the objectives to which we may 
choose to strive. Paul Kristeller (1981), for instance, stresses the civilizing mission 
of the humanities, the ability of these subjects to give individuals a ". . .broader 
and less provincial perspective, a better judgment and taste, and a greater insight 
and intellectual discipline based on the accurate grasp of facts and the acquired 
habit of precise and critical thinking". Watson Kirkconnel (1976) echos these 
sentiments, referring to a humanizing process implicit in ". . .projecting ourselves 
imaginatively into the environment, the problems and the characters created for 
us by the great masters. . .", in gaining perspective and the power of reflective 
and critical judgment in philosophy. Alan Bullock (1980) sees the humanities as 
the guardian of the unique and particular in human affairs and the only field of 
inquiry free of the restrictions of empiricism. Simone Reagor(1978) shares this 
concern with values and couples it with the mission to nurture and train ". . .those 
aspects of being and personality that are our highest attributes: reason, imagina-
tion, and the ability to communicate". 
There is another feature of the rhetoric which commands our attention and 
that is its central concern for the issue of human freedom. If the humanities focus 
on the qualities of being human such as reason, imagination and critical abilities, 
the quality of freedom seems paramount. Ralph Perry (1939) makes this the 
centerpiece of his definition: ". . .to embrace whatever influences conduce to 
f r e e d o m . . . " . By freedom he means " . . . en l ightened c h o i c e . . . t h e action in 
which habit, reflex, or suggestion are superseded by an individual's judgments of 
good and evil; the action whose premises are explicit; the action which proceeds 
from reflection and integration". Since freedom is proportional to the range of 
options, the first condition of Perry's freedom is learning. This anti-deterministic 
quality is shared by Hardison (1972) who insists that the world and the self are 
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indeterminate — they are but what we individually and collectively make of them. 
This is a long way from Freud's emphasis on instinct, Eysenck's hedonistic bio-
logism, Dostoevsky's pessimism, and Symon's willing brute. 
Three Approaches to the Humanities 
According to these humanists, then, the agenda for a renaissance in the humani-
ties would necessarily focus on the provision to individuals and collectivities of 
the intellectual and imaginative tools necessary to better make enlightened 
decisions. A straight-forward vision and one firmly embedded in the humanistic 
tradition, but one which also leads to a variety of responses. In reviewing current 
writing and organization around the humanities, I can discern three fundamental 
approaches and several sub-sets. 
The first approach I would characterize as traditionalist, the defence of the 
humanities being based on a notion of intrinsic value, coupled with a sense of 
faith that through reason society will eventually come to see this value. The study 
of literature, history, philosophy, art and language are valuable because they are 
valuable. Some supporters of this approach, recognizing that this is an age of 
proofs and that reason may not in fact prevail, have sought to define that value 
in terms of personal growth and citizenship and as well have sought to offer 
evidence that the humanities does engender these qualities. 
A second approach to characterizing this renaissance leaps further into the 
world of proofs and pragmatism and attempts to build a case for the humanities 
on very utilitarian grounds. The focus here is on 'use-value' — the social and 
vocational uses or value of the humanities. Many of the recently established 
humanities institutes would fit into this category. Finally, the third approach 
ties the humanities to issues of social change and liberation. 
The Traditionalist Approach 
The mere fact of having survived as a field of study for 2500 years is justification 
enough for many in the humanities to feel confident of the worth of their dis-
cipline. Ever conscious of the past, not as a weight but as a living tradition, many 
scholars reject any imperative to change, to prove, or to in any other way concede 
to transitory conditions. There is a kind of aristocratic paternalism at work here, 
a belief that the humanities should be central to education because of some inner 
logic beyond explanation. There is also a rather humble appreciation of the effect 
of the subject matter itself, independent of the machinations of the teacher: 
We are not in control of what happens with any of the material that 
we teach and any pretence that we are is muddleheaded. My job in 
teaching Chaucer is to expose the text and clear away the blocks, to 
cope with what has happened to language in 500 years, but in teach-
ing undergraduates my job is to let Chaucer work, and over that I am 
not in control. . .The work itself does what it ought to do, and it 
does it with a curious kind of individual tailoring to each individual 
student. My 'authority ' over what the effect of that work must be 
upon the individual human being with whom I am dealing is an 
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assumption of authority which has no justification, either in the 
traditions of my trade or in my own skill in learning. (Healy, 1975) 
Healy has certainly addressed the key issue, that of effects. To defend, justify or 
advance the position of the humanities in modern education seems to call for a 
concern with effects, the more pragmatic the better. The traditionalist approach 
rejects this gambit, indeed probably rejects the very basis of the exercise, the 
idea that such proofs exist. The difficulty, of course, is that discussions of the 
humanities must then assume an almost mystical or religious tone where ". . .the 
tone and style of the celebrant override the proof of the scientist" (Winter, 1981). 
There is a compelling reality to this faith in the power of the humanities, just 
as there is a compelling reality to religious faith. Steiner (1967) is no doubt correct 
when he says that a reading of Anna Karenina or Proust must affect the very 
core of our sexual feelings and that Kafka's Metamorphosis must forever alter 
the occasions when we view our image in a mirror. E.F. Schumacher (1973) is 
persuasive when he argues that by not knowing Shakespeare or its ilk, one simply 
"misses life". Northrop Frye (1964), echoing Matthew Arnold, celebrates the 
essential role of the humanities in developing the imagination which, indirectly, 
is crucial to making us 'human' , providing ". . .the kind of standards and values 
we need if we're to do anything better than adjust". Persuasive, but maddeningly 
'soft ' and elitist. In an age of accountability, democratization, and vocationalism 
such an approach may work at only those institutions sufficiently insulated from 
society to ignore these pressures. The inner directed, quality of life explanation 
of the humanities demands from the student a suspension of vocationalism and 
a leisurely approach to learning which is practical for only a few. 
Healy (1975), in his discussion of teaching Chaucer cited above, concludes his 
thoughts on the subject of the humanities by crediting them with the ". . .creation 
of citizenship under the wide heading of reasoning". Citizenship, while an old 
fashioned phrase to some, is certainly a general enough effect to be accepted by 
some as a reasonable goal and reasoning is almost universally seen as a central 
component of the study of the humanities. More important for those humanists 
who wish to go beyond the narrow strictures of the traditionalist approach, citizen-
ship and reasoning appear to lend themselves to some kind of measurement and 
thus open the door to the production of proofs. 
In major studies of the impact of higher education and the liberal arts in 
particular, Chickering (1969) and Heath (1968) have argued that there are a range 
of effects related to personal development, reasoning and, ultimately, citizenship. 
In the burgeoning field of research on individual moral and cognitive develop-
ment, Lawrence Kohlberg and others have argued that the humanities are uniquely 
suited to bringing about such development. By far the most impressive work of 
this genre, however, is the recent s tudyby David Winter and hiscolleagues(1981), 
A New Case for the Liberal Arts. Comparing students attending a small liberal 
arts college with those at a large university and several other colleges, and doing 
so through an elaborate series of tests and longitudinal studies, the authors con-
clude that the effects of the liberal arts experience are real and are qualitatively 
superior to the other educational experiences. 
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The research conducted by Winter contains few surprises for those already 
committed to the humanities, but it does make the move from faith to evidence. 
Effects were found in three major areas: 
1. Cognition: The students were better able to form and articulate complex con-
cepts and arrange confusing impressions and data. They were more intellectu-
ally flexible and consistent, able to deal in a rational and sophisticated way 
with conflicting arguments on both sides of controversial issues. 
2. Motivation: The students were better able to discipline and temper their 
power drives ". . .so they can mobilize resources and work for the goals of 
the larger society rather than pursue a profligate path of individual potency". 
3. Self-knowledge: The students had developed a more realistic, differentiated 
sense of their own strengths and weaknesses. 
One of the more interesting and impressive attributes to emerge from the research 
is essentially political, related to the ideal of citizenship. Speaking of the growth 
of maturity, the authors conclude that one of the greatest impacts of a liberal arts 
education is that students learn to ". . .adapt to the environment in more mature 
ways — learning the limits of authority, dealing consciously with ambivalent feel-
ings, and taking pleasure in work and other people". This is essentially a process 
of socialization, or perhaps the homogenization that Lasch was referring to, and 
what the study demonstrates is that the liberal arts do it best. 
It is with these paeans to citizenship that the traditional humanists come closest 
to a utilitarian ideal; forging a national community through a shared culture. 
Germany, France and the United States are notorious for using the humanities 
to such an end, but Canada provides an equally interesting though perhaps more 
benign case study. The role of classical education in Quebec in the 19th and well 
into the 20th century is an illustration of the power of the humanities when 
harnessed to political, national or ecclesiastic ends. Likewise the more contem-
porary rise of a nationalist literature and history in both English and French 
Canada is clearly linked to deliberate attempts to foster or even impose a sense 
of nationhood. The state-sponsored rise of Canadian Studies, Canadian music, 
drama and art, and the re-creation of a national culture in Quebec are powerful 
testimony to the regard for the humanities outside the academy. 
The link with politics and with the qualities of good citizenship provide a good 
beginning for defining a 'use' for the humanities. The process can be exhilerating 
for humanists impatient with attacks on their faith. It can also lead to over-
confidence. One advocate, ascribing to the humanities the development of tole-
rance, imagination, reasoning power, communicative abilities, and an appreciation 
of human complexity, asserts that "If a society's educational system is properly 
devoted to the humanities, these attributes will come to characterize the society 
itself (Reagor, 1978). George Steiner's caveat is a useful thing to keep in mind 
on these occasions. 
My own experience with the humanities lends considerable credence to an 
emphasis on attitudinal and socialization effects. For six years I taught history 
51 The Humanit ies and Higher Education 
to adult prisoners who were involved in a humanities-based university program 
in a Federal prison. The program had as its goal the development of cognitive 
and moral reasoning, attitude change, and subsequent change in behaviour. In a 
follow-up study of 75 released prisoners and a control group, we found a drama-
tic reduction in recidivism, consistent employment records, and evidence of very 
real attitude and social change (Ayers, 1980). It was tempting to ascribe this 
success to the humanities curriculum, but the story is probably more complex, 
involving peer pressure, the impact of a tightly-knit educational community in 
the prison, and the economic impact of higher education on subsequent employ-
ment. Nonetheless, the humanities courses obviously had an impact on attitudes 
and behaviour — a measurable impact. 
Once into the world of psychological testing, theories of attitude change and 
cognitive-moral development, the humanist is on essentially enemy ground and 
must tread carefully. The issues are complex, the instruments unreliable, and the 
whole field subject to a great deal of deliberate mystification. What appears so 
complex and perversely enticing may in fact be quite simple. My favourite anec-
dote concerning the impact of the humanities on attitudes and behaviour comes 
from an evaluation of a humanities project for early school leavers in Great Britain. 
When asked to describe the kind of effects they thought the program had had, 
one student replied: 
What I think about Humanities is that it widens your vocabulary and 
the way I think, tremendously I mean. Geoff's girl-friend was muck-
ing about and calling me all sorts of insulting names, and so on, and I 
just told her to stop making superfluous remarks — and she didn't 
know where to put herself. A normal everyday sort of person just 
doesn't use words like that; they've got no answer if you say some-
thing like that to them, you know. And I found it the same way, well, 
in the street, or arguments with teachers, you don't have to revert to 
violence, but to vocabulary, and if you come up with a lot of linked 
up, very long words that mean very small things — but they've never 
heard them before — they get all upset and don't know what to say 
and sort of reel about, you know. (MacDonald, 1978) 
This 'Pygmalion effect ' of a humanities education may be the most obvious and 
powerful contribution we make to individual development. We impart a complex 
and flexible yet still vernacular language which individuals may use to better 
interpret their reality and relate to their society. 
The Humanities As Utilitarian 
Some advocates of the humanities have not been content to rest their case on 
mere personal development or good citizenship. The focus instead is on the issue 
of 'use' rather than effect — use for both the individual and for society as a whole. 
The rise of ethics institutes concerned with medical ethics, the environment, 
business, ethics in science and so forth are prime examples of the new entrepre-
neurial strain among humanists. The potential for a practical application of moral 
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philosophy to social issues ranges from the profound (e.g., Justice Berger's impact 
on the development of the North) to the token (e.g., the 'house pacifist' at Herman 
Kahn's Hudson Institute). 
Again, the arguments for this approach are persuasive. We have little right, 
Keeney (1969) argues, to criticize scientists who pursue their research without 
sufficient attention to consequences if as humanists we do not try to use our 
knowledge in some social way. The humanities are seen as pivotal in making 
decisions about the use of the technologies of science and the information of the 
social sciences because such uses involve questions of value and value questions 
are the special domain of the humanities (Hoffman, 1982). Beyond that, the quite 
extraordinary crises and dilemmas which we must confront , from nuclear war to 
euthanasia to chronic unemployment would seem to demand that the humanities 
take more than a detached or passive role in our collective search for answers. 
There are, of course, dangers to this approach, this active involvement with con-
temporary society. The entrepreneurial humanities, promising answers in return 
for money and influence is no more attractive a concept than the entrepreneurial 
university which so many decry. Ultimately the real danger is one of promising 
more than can be delivered. We have the example before us of the social sciences, 
disciplines which promised much and delivered not enough. Poverty, racism, 
underdevelopment and a host of other social problems remain with us 30 years 
after their premature burial by many overly optimistic and entrepreneurial social 
scientists. The humanities are in enough trouble already and do not need to bear 
the additional cross of unfulfilled expectations. 
The utilitarian approach to the humanities also pervades the world of higher 
education, especially at the community college level. Some see the present crisis 
as a blessing, one which will force the humanities to abandon its defensive 'you 
don' t know it, but it's good for you' rationale and move instead toward more 
practical justifications. Thus, William Saunders (1982) talks of literary and histori-
cal studies as imparting " . . .life-enhancing skills with connections. . .between the 
lives we are living and the cultural traditions we have inherited". The humanities 
in this vision must emphasize communicative abilities, problem solving skills, and 
the techniques of making moral choices — all attributes with obvious vocational 
applications. 
In fact, as Lewis Solomon (1983) points out in a scathing attack on current 
euphoria surrounding humanities PhD's in business, it is virtually impossible to 
make a strong case for the purely vocational worth of the humanities. One can 
argue, as demonstrated above, that these disciplines improve reasoning in some 
very specific ways, promote leadership abilities, enhance oral and written com-
munication and impart problem solving skills, but in this age of specialization 
these qualities do not have obvious or immediate vocational applications. They 
do, nonetheless, complement a more narrow scientific or vocational education. 
Faced with this dilemma, many humanists, sometimes in desperation, have been 
forced into 'service' roles in higher education to save jobs and/or the very exis-
tence of their discipline. Thus we witness a proliferation of 'humanit ies ' programs 
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across North America with titles such as: Life Studies; Technology, Contemporary 
Society, and Human Values; Literature for Technicians; and Ethical Issues in 
Business (Beckwith, 1981). Each science, social science and professional disci-
pline is generating its own humanities component, providing a historical, ethical, 
literary or linguistic perspective on the particular problems and issues of that 
discipline. 
In the past year, I have attended two conferences which focused on this ulti-
litarian quest; one at the University of Chicago and the other at Sonoma State 
University in California. Both were besieged with registrants, most of them 
college and university teachers of liberal arts subjects who were looking for a 
way to protect their jobs, looking for a rationale or proof of the worth of their 
vocation. The Chicago conference, "Developmental Theory, Liberal Learning 
and Critical Thinking", focused on several analytical schemes which could be 
employed to demonstrate the effectiveness of the liberal arts, most notably the 
work of William Perry and that of Jane Loevinger. Much in the tradition of the 
Winter study, these schemes provided a way to measure, to evaluate, and thus to 
demonstrate worth to sceptical administrators. Well over 200 historians, philo-
sophers and teachers of literature spent a week grappling with the terminological 
and philosophical maze of the social sciences, learning about stage theory, develop-
mental psychology, psychoanalytic approaches, and statistics. 
The conference at Sonoma State, "Critical Thinking, Education, and the 
Rational Person", drew the same kind of audience and was even more entrepre-
neurial in its approach. 'Critical Thinking' was the product and the 'Informal Logic 
Movement' the delivery system. The conference had as its central assumption 
that critical thinking was the central aim of education and that it was not in fact 
being taught at all. Speakers acknowledged that critical thinking could be imparted 
through the traditional disciplines of knowledge, but since this was not occurring 
(as proven by various measurement devices), the task at hand was to teach it 
directly. Various means of doing this were paraded before the participants from 
DeBono's lateral thinking system to the Practical Reasoning program of the AVER 
group at the University of British Columbia. In all, at least ten separate critical 
thinking programs or packages were being marketed at the conference, each with 
its own set of proofs and statistical evidence. 
In Chicago the developmental psychologists were the gurus for the humanities 
while at Sonoma State it was the philosophers of the Informal Logic 'Movement'. 
Both meetings were characterized by a notable absence of discussion of the subject 
matter of the humanities or liberal arts, and an easy willingness to abstract, even 
reify, critical thinking into something which could and perhaps should be taught 
directly. At both meetings I had the impression of humanists who were confused, 
alarmed, and not a little naive being descended upon by yet another group of 
academic hucksters. The disciplines of knowledge the participants represented 
were being perceived as a means to an end that was demonstrable. 
The transformation of the humanities from core to ancillary service is obviously 
full of implications for the disciplines involved. On the one hand, it can be merely 
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a survival technique, a short-term tactic. On the other hand, it may serve to 
break down the sometimes petrified walls between the humanities disciplines 
and force a more holistic look at what the humanities can offer. Or, conversely, 
it could lead to even more compartmentalization among and within the disciplines 
as some become more 'vocationally relevant' than others. What happens to philo-
sophy, for instance, if ethics is the only branch of the discipline seen as useful? 
Or literature if only novels concerned with commerce are acceptable? The utili-
tarian road is fraught with dangers. 
Humanists can take some comfort from the fact that their dilemma is not a 
new one. Even at its birth the humanities were in contention with the more 
practical arts. Aristotle notes in his Politics that ". . .confusing questions arise 
out of the education that actually prevails, and it is not at all clear whether the 
pupils should practice pursuits that are practically useful, or morally edifying, 
or higher accomplishments. . ." (cited in King and Brownell, 1966). 
Humanities and Social Change 
The approaches to the humanities outlined so far have all had as their central 
focus maintaining, integrating or re-integrating the humanities with existing insti-
tutions and norms. Inevitably, there is another approach which chooses to see 
the humanities as a force for social transformation. Because the humanities have 
always had such a profound focus on tradition, on the development of the inner 
self, and a decidedly anti-deterministic stance, they have not generally been iden-
tified with forces and movements of social change. 
Much of the modern heritage of the humanities, on the other hand, is mired 
in revolutionary tradition. Secular humanism in the 18th century was a powerful 
pre-condition of revolutionary change and the scientific and industrial revolutions 
had their origins in the speculative tradition in the humanities. In our time, 
many of the challenges to militarism and technicism have their base in a moral 
critique as well as in a competing sense of what it means to be human. Hardison 
(1972) expresses this humanistic critique in the following: 
. . .it has opposed the values of modern society on the grounds that 
their abject surrender to things and abstractions denies man his free-
dom, strips him of his dignity, and leaves him an alien in his own 
world. The failure of modern society — its dehumanization of the 
working classes, its over-reliance on technology, its corresponding 
indifference to traditional human values, and its use of overt and 
covert force as substitutes for the organic social forms once sustained 
by these values — are the evidence on which the humanistic critique 
of modern society rests. 
The critique is all the more powerful in the latter decades of the 20th century 
as science and technology, along with the social sciences, have not only created 
problems seemingly beyond our control, but offer no ready solutions. 
The humanities offer more than a critique, though they stay clear of a blue-
print. For humanists like Paulo Freire and Antonio Gramsci, education in the 
humanities provides insight for empowerment. For Freire the task of education is 
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to go beyond concern for access to and distribution of knowledge and toward 
the definition, creation, and legitimation of knowledge. Critical thinking, a key 
concept in the idea of the humanities, is more than good reasoning, it is a politi-
cal act. "Critical thinking as a political act means that human beings must emerge 
from their own submersion and acquire the ability to intervene in reality as it is 
unveiled. Not only does this indicate that they must act with others to intervene 
in the shaping of history, it also means that they must 'escape' from their own 
history, i.e., that which society has made of them" (Giroux, 1980). In this sense 
we return to the notion of use, but not a use for adaptation or integration but 
rather one of change and transformation. Taught and perceived in this way, all 
of the effects of the humanities such as reasoning, insight, and imagination 
become tools for a 'critical consciousness'. 
One of the most powerful spokesmen for this view of the humanities is 
Antonio Gramsci. Speaking on behalf of the proletariat, he called for their con-
quest of intellectual power as an essential first step in challenging bourgeois 
hegemony. To accomplish this he said the proletariat must critically assimilate 
traditional humanistic knowledge: 
To create a new culture does not mean to make original discoveries 
on an individual basis. It also and especially means to critically popu-
larize already discovered truths, to make them, so to speak, social, 
therefore give them the consistency of basis for vital action, make 
them coordinating elements of intellectual and social relevance. That 
masses of men be led to evaluate in a coordinated way the present 
reality is, philosophically speaking, a much more important and 
original fact than the isolated philosophical genius' discovery of a 
certain truth, which is left in heritage to small intellectual groups, 
(cited in Welton, 1982) 
Gramsci's educational ideas were firmly rooted in traditional, mainstream human-
istic culture. The problem was the enforced isolation of this common culture 
from the mass of the population or, in Lasch's sense, the homogenization of that 
culture as it was translated to that population. From Gramsci's perspective folk-
lore and mysticism were the bane of the working classes and both were most 
efficiently negated by a traditional education in the humanities which taught 
that " . . .there exist social and state laws which are the product of human acti-
vity, which are established by men and can be altered by men in the interests of 
their collective development" (Entwhistle, 1978). 
CONCLUSION 
Academic journals are full of articles by humanists and their peers, all dissecting 
the humanities, lamenting their condition, and prescribing a variety of cures. Is 
this mere sound and fury, an imploding debate ignored by the very real forces of 
science and technology which are actively re-shaping the world? Or has the wave 
of material progress crested in the minds of men and the world awaiting a human-
ism which will bring order arid humanity back to the social order? Or, more likely, 
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is it still a struggle, still a contest between a social vision based on individual 
worth and dignity and one based on the movement of forces and interests beyond 
the range of such individuals? 
If the latter is the case and a renaissance of the humanities therefore worth 
fighting for, where does one begin and in which direction should one go? Clearly, 
there is no consensus here. Humanists would find it contradictory to their calling 
to be forced into schools of thought, to be made structural-functionalists or 
conflict theorists to use current paradigms from the social sciences. What has 
impressed me in this review is the breadth of the debate, the agreements on 
fundamentals and the tolerance of differences. Indeed, the debates among 
humanists would seem to bear out the findings of the Winter study that the 
humanities are anathema to authoritarian models and are productive of tolerance 
and the ability to entertain conflicting points of view. 
Each perspective discussed in this paper is an integral part of the struggle to 
make the humanities a vital force in the lives of individuals and societies in the 
late 20th century. The traditionalists, be they high priests or dinosaurs, serve to 
keep the rest of us honest by their cautionary scepticism. The worst move for 
the humanities would be to promise too much to a public already jaded and 
wary of academics bearing gifts. Those who stress the qualities of personal 
development and try to prove their point act as the crucial bridge to colleagues 
in the social sciences, many of whom have come to realize the limitations of 
their own disciplines and see linkage with the humanities as a potential synthesis. 
The ultilitarians occupy the most dangerous ground in that they offer a facile 
kind of relevance, but they do keep the humanities in the public eye, probing 
the boundaries of social utility. While seen by many as dangerous and regrettably 
irresistible, such efforts to 'sell' the humanities may be an essential step in main-
taining strength within existing institutions. Finally, those who advocate linking 
the humanities to social and cultural change keep these disciplines at the fore-
front of the debates which characterize our times. To a world bereft of answers 
to questions that cannot be ignored, they offer a 'way of seeing' that transcends 
the ideological and politicized traps that have locked us in sterile paradigms. 
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